The
Golden Cage: Stability of the institution of marriage in India
I. Introduction
The institution of marriage under
which reproduction is expected to take place across most cultures and religious
groups over centuries is found to be breaking down, rather pretty fast, in the
western societies. There is a growing concern that similar situation may spread
across the globe (Inglehart,1970, 1985; Lesthaeghe,
2002, 2010; Weiss, 1975, 1979). According to statistics compiled by the United
Nations on marriage (United Nations, 2012), a very high proportion of women in the age group 30-34
reported to be unmarried in many west European countries and the United States.
In 2009, it was 48.7% in France, 47.8% in the United Kingdom and 26.3 % in the
USA. Many of these women reported to be unmarried legally are living with their
partners in conjugal relationships called, ‘live-in’ arrangements. Live-in
arrangements are cohabitations without formal marriage between the sexes and
even of persons in the same sex and have become an alternative to formal
marriage, at least on a temporary basis in many western countries. Evidence of this comes from the fact that in
the decade (2001-10) more than 50 % of the births in England occurred to un-married
women. Even among married women the
divorce rates are rising rapidly. Even in 1979, there was approximately one
divorce for every two marriages in the United States. It was considered that
all these developments are the direct consequences of demographic transition
and all nations will eventually have to experience the ‘second demographic
transition’ of changes of such nature (Lesthaeghe,
2010).
But
against the European experience, the East Asian countries with rapid
demographic transition show a different pattern of marriage and divorce. There
is far greater stability of marriage and far
lower incidence of divorce in these countries. At the same time, one of the
major changes observed in these countries is the proportion remaining never
married. For instance, in the age group 30-34, the percentage single was 19 per
cent in Korea and 35 per cent in Japan in 2009.
On the contrary, the only 1.6 per cent of the children are born out of
wedlock in South Korea in 2007 and negligible in India,
while in the United States nearly 40 percent of babies born out of wedlock. Though
the percentage single in Japan and Korea is
relatively high, there are practically no births outside marriage in these countries. Even the live-in relationship in Japan is
quite low at 2 per cent among women 20 years and above as against 14 per cent
in France, 9 per cent in UK.
Undoubtedly, the form and nature of
marriage and family life have changed over the past decades in the western societies as well as in East Asia but through different
pathways. Reproduction is getting delinked from marriage in the West while in
East Asia remaining single has become more of a
norm resulting in far below replacement level fertility in these countries. “Live-in”
arrangements are becoming wide spread and even among legal marriages divorces
are more common in the West while such changes are rare in East Asia although
increasing at a rapid pace in recent times.
A
great deal of social science research has been focused on the topics of
marriage and divorce and research into these areas
have led to the identification of some of the major factors contributing to the
breakdown of this institution in the west. The formulation of second
demographic transition theory has been an outcome of the empirical examination
of such trends across countries (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe et al., 2006). To
quote Lesthaeghe, “during the first
demographic transition (FDT), the decline in fertility was unleashed by an
enormous sentimental and financial investment in the child (i.e., the “king child
era” to use Ariès’s term), whereas the motivation during the second demographic
transition (SDT) is adult self realization within the role or life style as a
parent or more complete and fulfilled adult”. The breakdown in the institution of marriage
seems to have commenced in the ‘sixties of the twentieth century and is continuing unabated.
Some scholars have postulated that this would eventually happen even in Asian
countries (Lesthaeghe, 2010)
According
to available literature among the major causes for breakdown of marriage four
have been emphasised though not exhaustive: viz., 1) rise of individualism 2)
the economic independence of women and rising cost of marriage for women iii) skill
specializations and 4) movement towards gender equality and
all of them were facilitated by the discovery and easy availability of female
contraceptives. We will briefly describe them below.
a)
Rise of Individualism: The spread of individualism in most aspects of one’s life
was observed by many as early as in the middle of the last century. While
studying the American families Kuhn (1955) observed
that individualism is not just limited to one cause but is the result of
several factors such as protestantism, capitalism and breakdown of inherited
and ascribed relationship.
b) Costs of marriage: Yet another reason identified for
the breakdown of marriage is the cost of family formation. According to Becker (1960,
1996) and many other economists all human decisions including personal ones are
ultimately based on an economic cost benefit analysis whether done overtly or
not. When the society is economically backward it makes economic sense to marry
and have children to add to the labor force of the family and living in one
house reduces costs. When the society develops and costs of rearing children
rises parents want to control their family size and the decisions are
euphemistically put as “Baby or Baby Austin”. When the society becomes
economically more advanced and women have good employment potential with
specialized skills the costs of marriage for a woman far outweigh the economic
benefits.
c): Specialization of skills: There is growing specialization of skills
occurring as the natural bye product of rapid economic development and
consumerism that is taking place in the western societies and this trend is
occurring in the developing countries as well with a time lag. Specialization is
seen in terms of employment, education, and health care and social services.
Even in schools and colleges the courses offered for study are becoming varied
and specialized. Similarly in manufacturing, distribution of goods and
services, health care, banking and other services. Many responsibilities have
been transferred from the family to these specialized services like homes for
the aged, security services, maintenance services etc. (Desai
and Dubey, 2011). The traditional functions of the family has been taken over by
non-familial institutions as a part of the social and economic development of
the country and marriage has become the
casualty of this over specialization.
d) Gender equality: Most of the societies in the world in
the east or in the west have been based on patriarchy for centuries where women
played a secondary or subordinate role to men. This situation has dramatically
changed in many parts of the world the over the past century with women getting
more and more educated, economically gainfully employed, politically empowered
and women’s movements throughout the world arguing for gender equality in all
aspects of human existence. Their equity and equality have been demanded as a
fundamental aspect of human rights. Powerful feminist movements in Europe and
USA have written about and argued for women’s freedom to shape their own lives.
The institution of marriage was considered by many as a hindrance on securing
gender equity and equality. Many argue
that marriage and family have tended to contribute to gender inequities and
those aspire for female autonomy and gender equity found the institution of
marriage a remnant of patriarchal system.
II. Objectives of the study
It
is possible that each of the
contributory factors that operated towards the decline of the institution of
marriage is not relevant to the Indian cultural context and the institution of
marriage is relatively stable in India as yet. However fears have been
expressed from different quarters that what began in the west and extended to
other parts of the world will definitely occur in India and there are already
signs and symptoms (Lesthaghe 2010; Srinivasan 2014). A web-based survey of the
population professionals in India was carried out during October 2013 to
January 2014 by the senior author mainly to ascertain their views on various
population related issues and policies and programs in the country since 1951.
A question was also asked of their view or perception on the stability of the
institution of marriage in India. The survey was carried out using the “Survey
Monkey” web and a sample of 242 professionals in the field which was just 15%
of the professionals to whom the questionnaire was sent was covered. A sample
of non-respondents was also later surveyed to get just their background details
in order to assess the differences between the distributions of the respondents
and non-respondents. Since there were no significant differences between the
two distributions on a number of variables the author decided to proceed with
an analysis.
The analysis, against the expectation, showed
that more than half of the respondents (53%) perceived marriage as “an
institution within which child bearing should take place” will break down in
India also and child bearing will eventually be delinked from marriage. The
other 47% perceive that this will not happen at any time in the future. Though
this finding is based on a small sample of population professionals
constituting only just a small segment which may not reflect the real picture, it
has rung some alarm bells on the future of marriages in India.
This
paper, therefore, looks into the patterns of marriage in India with twin
objectives in mind. First, it analyses the changes in the marital distributions
in India , especially the proportions single and currently married and previously married among women to study
the secular trends in their distributions and explore whether there is already a trend of imminent breakdown in the institutor of
marriage as is happening in Western
societies. Second, the paper compares the trends in marital status
distributions in India and Japan with those in France, UK and USA and wish to interpret the data on later age at
marriage and larger proportion of women remaining single till the end of the
reproductive period. As marriage has deep cultural roots and origin and has foundation
in the caste system, the factors that are contributing to the breakdown of
marriage may be different in India and is also examined in brief.
III. Data Used and methods of analysis
In
this study, which is to be considered as a precursor of studies to be followed on
the same topic with more focused investigations, we analyze the data on marital
status distributions at two levels; the macro and micro levels. At the macro
level we used the data compiled from the population censuses in India and four selected
states from 1961 to 2011. For state level
analysis we selected Bihar, Kerala
Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. Kerala and
Tamil Nadu are considered to be more developed states, socially and
economically; while Bihar and Uttar Pradesh represent the less developed
states. In terms of Human Development Index (HDI) values estimated at the state level for 23
states of India by the Planning Commission of India in March 2014 based on
2007-08 values, Kerala ranked No. 1,
Tamil Nadu - 8, Uttar Pradesh- 18 and Bihar -21. For the micro level analysis
we used the data collected at the individual level in the National Sample
Survey-3 in India during 2005-06 for India and the four selected states
We also
compiled data on the reported marital status of women in four developed
countries, France, Japan, UK and USA as available in the data sets published by
the United Nations in their latest set “
World Marriage Prospects -2014” for the
years 1970 to 2010 . These data based on their population censuses and
surveys carried out between 1970 and 2010 are tabulated
and given in Table 3. Table 3 A provides
the data for France , Table 3 B for Japan , Table 3 C for UK and Table 3 D for
USA. The exact year to which these data relate for India and the countries are
in given at the end of Table 4, that provides the Singulate
Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) values of these countries along
with that of India for comparison purposes.
IV. Indicators of Changes in
Marriage Pattern
The
study has used many conventional indicators like percentage remaining single,
mean age at marriage and divorce rate for understanding the changes in marriage
patterns in India in comparison to the
developed countries.
a)
Single or Unmarried women in India
Table
1 presents percentage of females remaining single classified in five year age
groups from 15-54 for all India along with the four states mentioned above. It
can be seen that in terms of percent single that there has been a steady
secular increase in the values in the age groups 15-19 and 20-24 and even in
25-29 implying a rise in the age at marriage but after wards from the age group
30-34 onwards there is a secular decline. This is true with respect to states
with advanced demographic transition and early demographic transition implying
a rapid rise in the incidence of marriage across the country. For example in Kerala the percent single in
the age group 30-34 in 2011 was 5.0 and in Bihar it was 1.2. In the same year
in the age group 50-54 the percent of women remaining single in Kerala was 3.3
compared to 0.4 in Bihar (approximated to the second decimal), Charts 1A and 1B
give pictorial representation of the trend lines in the percentage single in
India and the four states for the age groups 25-29 and 30-34 respectively. We
can see from Chart 1 A low the percentage single in all the states seem to
converge over time to Kerala value of 111.9
and in Chart 1 B there is clear rising
trend in all the states to Kerala levels but the gaps are still quite
wide. While Kerala had 5.0% single in 2011, all other states had between 1 and
4% but rising to the Kerala levels. Women in Kerala marry quite late in their
mid-twenties but by age 30 to 35 or around 33, most
of them do get married. Marriage is as much universal in Kerala as in the other
states in spite of its higher literacy rates, much better health conditions and
high status of women. It is worth pointing out that the percentage of women
reported single in 2011 SRS data are sharply higher in all age groups compared
to the 2001 census data and this requires further investigations. However the
findings on the trends on the proportions single until ages 25-29 and sharp
declines thereafter remain unaffected.
b) SMAM values
The
Singulate Mean age at Marriage for women (SMAM) computed on the basis of data
on percentage singles using the standard procedures developed by Hajnal (1953)
are given in Table 2. For India, as a whole, it increased from 16.8 in 1961 to
18.7 in 1981 and to 21.0 in 2011. For Bihar the increase was from 15.9 to 17.1
to 19.7; for Kerala the rise was from 20.1 in 1961 to 21.8 in 1981 and to 21.7
in 2011; for Tamil Nadu the figures were 18.5 to 20.3 to 21.9 and in UP it was
from 16.0 to 17.3 to 21.1. Thus the increase in the SMAM values over the 50
year period 1961-2011 was just 2.6 years in Kerala, 4.6 years in Tamil Nadu, 5.1
years in Bihar and 6.2 years in Uttar Pradesh.
The data show a rapid convergence of all the states in their SMAM values
to the Kerala level. Thus the less developed states are catching up with the
advanced states in the SMAM values. While the marriage age of the less
developed states is rising rapidly there is a slowdown in the rate of increase
in the more developed states.
c) Comparison with situation in the four
developed countries
The data on percentage of women remaining
single in different age group for France, Japan, UK and USA for the period
around 1970 to 2010 are presented in Tables 3. The data for these four
developed countries present a totally different picture from India. In the
30-34 age- group while the percent single in India in 2011 was 4.0, it was 48.7
in France in 2009; was 34.5 in Japan; 47.8 in UK and 26.3 in USA. It is obvious
that a high proportion of women reporting as “single” in these four countries in
the age group 30-34 may be having a “live-in” arrangements and they are living
in conjugal relationships with their spouses but not legally married. Even in
the age group 50-54 the percentage reporting single in these four countries
were 14.4, 8.7, 10.2 and 10.0 much higher than what is reported for Kerala
state at 3.3 and India at 1.2. Thus the institution of marriage has been on the
decline in these developed countries for over four decades.
The scatter plots of the SMAM values of
India compared with other four developed countries is given in Chart 4. From
this scatter plots it can be seen that the SMAM values are also steadily increasing
in these four developed countries implying a steady rise in ‘live-in”
arrangements in these countries. In Japan in the context of a very small
proportion of births occurring to single mothers as compared to other three
developed countries, the prevalence of ‘live-in’ arrangements may not be that wide spread as in the other
three western countries.
d. Incidence of divorces
Chart
5 presents the percentage of women in different age groups reported “divorced”
around 2010 in the four developed countries. For India, the extent of divorces in
recent years is not available. There is likelihood of more of “separations”
reported in India than formal divorces. Thus there is a possibility of divorce
rate reported being an underestimate in India but same is nearly true in
developed countries as well in recent times. Although the most of the formal marriages
are registered in developed countries, the separation from “live-in”
arrangements may not be reported as divorce irrespective of the duration of
“live-in” life by the couple. Since the duration of such “live-in” life is also
increasing even in developed countries the reported rates of divorce may actually
be higher than what is reported for these countries. Thus there is a problem of
quality of data on percent of women reported as “divorced” both in India and
the developed countries and both may be grossly underestimated. But, the order
of differences may indicate a picture not far from reality.
From Table 3 and Chart 5 it can be seen that
even while the marriage rate is declining, the percentage of women reporting as
divorced within this declining group is increasing over the years. In France,
it was 4.9 in 1970 that increased to 16.3 by 2010; in Japan it increased from
3.8 to 9.2; in UK it rose from 2.0 to 19.0 and in USA from 5.5 to 17.4. The rise in divorce rates is the lowest in Japan
compared to France, UK and USA. Chart 5 gives a bar diagram of the percentage
of women reporting divorced in these four countries and India around 2010 and
1991.
e. Single status among men
When we study the
universality of marriage and its stability in India it is important to
corroborate the findings based data on females with similar data on men. Table 5
presents data on the percentage of men single in the year 2011 for India as a whole and the four states. We
find that in India the percentage single among men was 95 in the age group
15-19, declined sharply to 11 in the age group 30-34 and to 2 in the age group
50-54. In Kerala the percents single in these there age groups were 99, 22 and 1.
The trend of decline in the percentage single in these four states clearly
shows convergence to almost zero percent of remaining single by age 55.
V.
Findings from micro level analysis.
The
analysis contained in the above sections is based on aggregate level data at
the state and national levels within India and across selected developed
countries for comparative purposes. They provide only broad patterns on the
distributions of women by marital status for comparison across selected states
in India and countries over time. In the micro level analysis we use the data
collected in the third round of National Family Health
Survey (NFHS-3), coordinated by the International Institute for Population
Sciences (IIPS) under the aegis of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government
of India, conducted in 2005-06. In this
survey all women in reproductive ages 15-49 were interviewed unlike in NFHS-1
and NFHS-2 where only ever married women were considered for the survey. NFHS-3
collected information from a nationally representative sample of 109,041
households, 124,385 women age 15-49, and 74,369 men age 15-54. The NFHS-3
sample covers 99 percent of India’s population living in all 29 states.
We analyzed the data on
the marital status of women reported in the survey grouping them as “never
married/single”, “ever married” that includes “currently married” and,
“previously married” (includes widowed, divorced and separated women). We used
a simple binomial logit regression using five predictors viz; age, rural/urban
status, education level of the woman, wealth index of the house hold and the
variables of religion and caste combined as ‘religio-caste’ variable. While age
is used as a continuous variable the other four are used as discrete or
categorical variables. For ‘religio-caste’ we used a single ascribed variable
that combines religion and caste among ‘Hindus’. We used dummies for the four
states. The categorization of “religio-caste’’ variable that we used was; 1:
Christians; 2: Muslims; 3: Hindu Scheduled caste; 4: Hindu Scheduled tribe; 5:
Hindu Other backward caste; 6: Hindu others; and 7: Other religions. The reason
for our combining religion and caste into a single variable was that even among
Christians and Muslims, a significant proportion among them were scheduled
castes, scheduled tribes and other backward castes. Caste which is predominantly an ascribed nomenclature assigned at the time
of birth for a child born in the Hindu religion is now becoming increasingly
prevalent in other religious categories in India. In our present analysis, we
found that the presence of caste categorization among religions other than
Hindus confounds the effects of caste and religion on the marital status and
this required the formation of a new variable “religio-caste” as given above.
From Table 6, it can be seen that all the variables selected as
predictors have a highly significant odds ratios on the probability of getting
married. Age, used as continuous variable has an odds ratio of 1.5 and
indicates that controlling for other factors it increases the odds of marrying
by 50%. Even controlling for age and other achieved variables of place of
residence, education and wealth index, the effects of the “religio-caste”
variable has the maximum impact among the Hindus in all caste categories with
odds ratios over 2, compared to Christians. The highest odds ratio of 2.94 is found among the Hindu OBCs. The
odds ratios in all categories of the three
achieved variables of rural/urban residence, wealth index and education
of women are below 1 indicating that the
maximum probability of marriage is among the rural, illiterate and poorest
women and any changes in these variables contributes to upward mobility and
reduces the odds ratios. The dampening effect on the probability of getting
married or moving from single status to the ever married status of the three
ascribed variables is revealed from this analysis. Most important finding is
the high odds ratios of the “religio-caste” variable. Use of state dummies in
the logit reveals that the sates of Tamil Nadu (0.55) and Kerala (0.85) have
odds ratios below 1 while Bihar
(1.57)and Uttar Pradesh (1.04) have above 1, with all the other states
combined and used as base for comparison.
The main inference we can
draw from this analysis is that the
ascribed variables of religion and caste are more important factors in
the probabilities of marriage for a single women even after controlling for the
achieved variables of rural/urban residence; education for women, and index of
wealth of the family. As we will be arguing below in the discussion section,
the institution of marriage is strongly embedded over centuries within the
religious and caste fold. Inter caste marriages and inter religious marriages
are socially condemned and frowned upon. Hence we wanted to find out whether
the two ascribed factors dominate over achievement factors in determining
marriage and age at marriage.
VII. Summary and Discussions
In Section- I above, we listed four major factors that have
contributed to the breakdown of the institution of marriage in the west. We
wish to argue that none of these factors are relevant for the population of
India currently. The first of the four factors is the ‘rise of individualism’
and its negative impact on marriage in the west. In India this is not likely to happen in the
near future since any individual in the Indian culture is a part of a larger
net work of family, gothra, caste and religion. From its birth a girl child is
brought up as a daughter to be married off at a later age, fully dependent on
the parents till marriage, later a dependent on her husband, and if
unfortunately to be widowed after marriage to be dependent on son and after
death to be lit in the funeral pyre by a son to get merit in the other world. There
appears to have been no major changes in such norm in India even with considerable demographic
and socio-economic changes. No religious groups are an exception to this fact. One
example of this is the dowry system which is practiced across all religious
groups in India. Similarly a boy is told from very young age of his
responsibilities to his family, parents, sisters and various evils or (“papas”)
that will descend on him if he ignores his parents or his family in their old
age. Thus there is no question of anyone born in India declaring that he is an “individual”
bereft of all his familial connections and concentrating on his own personal
development. At least for many decades to come, this is not likely to happen.
On the second factor of
cost-benefit analysis of girls marrying within and outside the same caste many
studies have brought out the economic and emotional benefits of a girl marrying
within the same caste. In an interesting study of marriages based on the advertisements
in the “matrimonial columns” of Anand Bazar Patrika (a daily news paper in
Calcutta), Banerjee et. al (2013) made
an interesting and detailed analysis of the data collected by follow up visits to
a large number of marriages that took place over many decades on the basis of
these matrimonial ads. Their analysis included a detailed econometric analysis
of the data collected from the women interviewed in this study and concluded
that marrying within the same caste is socially and economically advantageous
both to the bride and the bride groom. To quote from their major findings “One
of our key empirical findings is that there is a very strong preference for
within-caste marriage. However, because both sides of the market share this
preference and because the groups are fairly homogeneous in terms of the
distributions of other attributes, in equilibrium, the cost of wanting to marry
within-caste is low. This allows caste to remain a persistent feature of the
Indian marriage market”.
The extent of
prevalence of same caste and inter-caste marriages in India has been studied by
Das et. al (2010) using data collected from the
National Family Health Survey -3 conducted during 2005- 06 in India, in which information on the
caste category of each member of the household was obtained by the interviewer
through a structured questionnaire. The caste categories used in this analysis
is only four viz. SC, ST, OBC and others. Thus, only a when the husband and
wife belonged to a different category among these four groups it was considered
an inter caste marriage. Such a broad caste categorization can be expected to
grossly underestimate the magnitude of inter caste marriages which take place
within each broad category. Many inter-caste marriages do take place within the
broad caste category as OBC, SC and ST. However the order of magnitude of
inters caste marriages found in this study is quite revealing. The study found
that as a whole the percent of married women in the age range 15-49 reporting
marriage within the same caste category was 89; in Bihar 89; in Kerala 80; in
Tamil Nadu 97 and in Uttar Pradesh 88 (Das et al, 2010). It is really
surprising that In Tamil Nadu which had a strong Dravidian movement for over
six decades and the Dravidian parties in power for over four decades and which
officially promoted and rewarded inter caste marriages, the percent of
marriages reported within the same caste is as high as 97. Though the data quality
on caste reported in NFHS-3 may be called to question the order of magnitude of
percent of inter caste marriages reported across all the states, more developed
or less developed, can be considered to be quite low.
The third factor that contributed to the decline of marriages on
the west is the over specialization of skills and almost each person becomes
unique in his /her skills. In India with large percentage of workers still employed
in agriculture this is not likely to happen in the near future. Even in the
secondary and tertiary sectors such a level of specialization of skills as
observed in the west are not found and in IT sector most of the jobs are really
those outsourced from the developed countries because of the differences in the
cost of labor.
The fourth factor is “gender equality and
parity” and India is far from this goal. Based on various measures on gender disparity
such as sex selective female feticides, education, employment , freedom to
marry one whom she loves, domestic violence ,employment, economic freedom and many
others Indian women rank very low to other women not only in developed
countries but also in Asia. The poor status of women is reflected in highly
skewed sex ratio (0-6) among children, high maternal mortality rates, high
level of malnutrition, morbidity rates etc.
According
to the Global Gender Gap Report released by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in
2011, India was ranked 113 on the Gender Gap Index (GGI) among 135 countries
polled. During the past three years,
India has improved its rankings on the World Economic Forum's Gender Gap Index
(GGI) to 105/136 in 2013 but is still quite low in the comity of nations. This
index measured the gap in education, longevity and employment political
representation between men and women. Various gender empowerment
measures have scaled India almost close to 130-140 rank out of 175 countries
and in spite of various efforts made by the governments, non-governmental
organizations and a few political parties the gender inequalities on the scale
achieved in the west cannot be realized in the near future. Indian women
tend to be valued by society in relation to their role in the family, namely as
a wife, daughter-in-law, and mother. Women who fall outside of these roles,
such as widows and single women, face
discrimination and in many cases, loss of property. Since a woman is considered
incomplete without being married, a strong social stigma exists for unmarried
adult women, widows, and divorcees. A detailed discussion on gender
inequalities and demographic behavior in India can be had in Desai (1994) in which she argues marrying and having a son
as early as possible is the only choice available for most of the women in
India for social acceptability and
upward mobility in India. Thus marriage seems to be the only saving grace for
restoring the status of women in Indian society.
The low percentage of inter
caste marriages is equally observed among the more educated as among the poor
educated , among the better economic groups as in the poorer groups and among
those exposed to the mass media as among those not exposed. Marriages
within the same religion were 85% among Hindus, 89%
among Muslims, and 90 % among others. It was almost constant among those with
different standard of living index (SLI) and among those exposed to mass media
or not at 89%. Thus there appears to be structural caste rigidity in relation to marriages in India that cuts across
education and economic groups. It can be inferred that as long as caste system
is not basically disturbed the institution of marriage as it is prevailing now
may not undergo any radical changes.
Thus based on the proportions of women at different age groups
remaining single and trends over the past fifty years in India as whole and two
more advanced and two less advanced states in terms of socio-economic
development, it is found that while development in India has contributed to a
significant rise in age at marriage, it has not altered the ultimate
proportions getting married by ages 30-34. Most of the women, 97%, get married
by the age of 45-49 even in the most developed state of Kerala and more than
98% in the other three states. The percent reporting divorced or separated is
very low at all ages, less than 1%. These figures are in complete contrast with
what is observed in the developed countries of the west and Japan. We have
compared the levels and trends in single, married and divorced states of women
in different ages in three developed countries of the West, France, UK and USA
and Japan with India and the states and draw the conclusion that the
institution of marriage is strong in India and is not showing nor likely to
show as feared by some professionals in a survey to break down in the future.
Micro level analysis using NFHS-3 data show the strongest linkage between age shifts
in marital status from single state to married state
over riding all other factors. The ascribed factors of religion and caste have
more effects on the odds ratios than education or wealth status of the
household.
A strong contributing factor behind the stability
in the institution of marriage is that marriages are still taking place within
the same caste and there is a strong caste support behind every marriage. This
is rather unfortunate because the social evils and economic impediments of the
rigid caste structure are well known and many leaders including Mahatma Gandhi
and Narayana Guru and Periar in the south have fought relentlessly against it
for over many decades. The efforts of
many social and political movements like the Dravidian movement in Tamil Nadu
that were in power and encouraging inter caste marriages over the past seven decades, does not appear to have had
any impact since even in Tamil Nadu where the reported percent of inter-caste marriages is only about 3% during
2005-06 as found from NFHS-3. Similarly
the analysis of data on requirements for a spouse as published in the
advertisements in the matrimonial columns of newspapers and web sites specify
the requirement of the same caste as an essential condition for marriage by most
of the applicants, irrespective of their socio-economic background. The caste
based vote bank politics supported by many national and regional political
parties have strengthened the caste system. Perhaps, one of the contributions
of the caste system seems to be the stability it has brought to the institution
of marriage in India. The costs and
benefits of the caste system requires a Beckerian analysis; whether
disruptions at the family level maintained by increased live-in arrangements ,
high divorce rates , children reared by single parents avoided by the caste
based marriage system will be the trade off for achieving a more egalitarian
and faster going nation. However women in India seem to be safely trapped, as
of present and for the near future, in the golden cage of marriage set up by
religion, caste and economic forces. Though the stability of the institution of
marriage in India is taken for granted by the Indian scholars and public at
large, the above study highlights the routes of such stability in factors of
religion, caste and high social and economic cost of marital breakdown.
References
Banerjee,
Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Maitreesh Ghatak, and Jeanne Lafortune (2013), "Marry for
What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India", American Economic Journal:
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Becker, Gary S.
(1960), “An Economic Analysis of
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Becker, Gary S.
(1996), Accounting for Tastes, Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press.
Das, Kumudini, Kailash
Chandra Das, Tarun Kumar Roy, Pradeep
Kumar Tripathy (2010), “Inter-caste Marriages in
India: Has it really changed over time?”,
Paper presented at the European Population Conference-2010, Vienna,
Austria, http://epc2010.princeton.edu/papers/100157).
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(1994), “Gender Inequalities and demographic behavior in India”, New
York: The Population Council.
Desai, Sonalde and Amaresh Dubey (2011), “Caste in
21st Century India: Competing Narratives” Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol - XLVI No. 11, March 12.
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IIPS and Macro
International (2007), National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3),
2005-06: India, Vol 1, Mumbai:
International Institute for Population Sciences.
Inglehart, R.
(1970), The Silent Revolution, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R.
(1985). “Aggregate stability and individual-level flux in mass belief systems:
the level of analysis paradox”, American Political Science Review, Vol.
79, P: 97–116.
Kuhn, M.H. (1955), "American Families Today:
Development and Differentiation of Types," in Becker R Hill (ed) Family Marriage and Parenthood, Boston:
D.C. Heath.
Lesthaeghe, R.
(2002), “Meaning and Choice: Value Orientations and Life Course Decisions”,
NIDI-CBGS Monograph No. 37, The Hague: Netherlands Interdisciplinary
Demographic Institute.
Lesthaeghe, R.
(2010),”The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition”, Population
and Development Review, Vol. 36, No. 2, P:211-252.
Lesthaeghe, Ron
J., and Lisa Neidert (2006), “The Second Demographic Transition in the United
States: Exception or Textbook Example?” Population
and Development Review, Vol. 32, No. 4, P: 669-698.
Maslow, A.
(1954), Motivation and Personality,
New York, Harper and Row.
Srinivasan, K.
(2014), “India’s Population Issues and Policies: Professionals’ Perceptions”,
(Findings from a survey of professionals in the field), Report on a web based
survey submitted to the Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR).
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(2012), “World Marriage Prospects – 2012”, New York: United Nations. (http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WMD2012/MainFrame.html).
Weiss, R.S.
(1975), Marital Separation, New York: Basic Books.
Weiss, R.S.,
(1979) Going it Alone, New York: Basic Books.
Table 1: Percentage of females remaining single in
different age group, India, Bihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu
and Uttar Pradesh 1961 – 2011.
|
Year
|
Age Group
| |||||||
|
15-19
|
20-24
|
25-29
|
30-34
|
35-39
|
40-44
|
45-49
|
50 - 54
| |
|
India
| ||||||||
|
1961
|
29.2
|
6.0
|
1.9
|
1.0
|
0.7
|
0.6
|
0.5
|
0.5
|
|
1971
|
43.7
|
9.5
|
2.3
|
1.0
|
0.8
|
0.6
|
0.5
|
0.5
|
|
1981
|
55.9
|
14.0
|
3.3
|
1.2
|
0.6
|
0.5
|
0.4
|
0.4
|
|
1991
|
64.3
|
17.0
|
4.2
|
1.8
|
0.9
|
1.0
|
0.7
|
0.8
|
|
2001
|
75.2
|
23.0
|
5.7
|
2.2
|
1.3
|
1.2
|
0.9
|
0.9
|
|
2011
|
87.8
|
37.3
|
12.2
|
4.0
|
1.4
|
1.7
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
|
Bihar
| ||||||||
|
1961
|
15.6
|
3.0
|
1.3
|
0.9
|
0.7
|
0.6
|
0.6
|
0.6
|
|
1971
|
23.1
|
3.6
|
1.0
|
0.5
|
0.4
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
|
1981
|
35.3
|
5.2
|
1.3
|
0.5
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
0.2
|
0.2
|
|
1991
|
44.2
|
7.1
|
1.6
|
0.9
|
0.4
|
0.7
|
0.5
|
0.8
|
|
2001
|
60.4
|
9.5
|
1.5
|
0.7
|
0.6
|
0.3
|
0.2
|
0.3
|
|
2011
|
86.0
|
27.8
|
5.1
|
1.5
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
|
Kerala
| ||||||||
|
1961
|
69.6
|
22.7
|
8.0
|
4.5
|
3.2
|
2.9
|
2.2
|
1.8
|
|
1971
|
81.0
|
32.7
|
9.3
|
5.3
|
3.7
|
3.5
|
3.1
|
2.9
|
|
1981
|
85.4
|
40.2
|
12.5
|
5.8
|
3.5
|
3.4
|
2.9
|
3.1
|
|
1991
|
88.5
|
43.4
|
13.9
|
6.2
|
3.9
|
3.7
|
3.0
|
3.2
|
|
2001
|
86.7
|
41.6
|
13.0
|
5.8
|
3.9
|
3.5
|
3.2
|
3.4
|
|
2011
|
93.1
|
48.1
|
14.6
|
6.3
|
3.9
|
2.6
|
2.8
|
3.5
|
|
Tamil Nadu
| ||||||||
|
1971
|
72.7
|
17.0
|
2.7
|
1.2
|
0.7
|
0.7
|
0.6
|
0.5
|
|
1981
|
76.8
|
22.9
|
4.8
|
1.7
|
0.8
|
0.7
|
0.5
|
0.4
|
|
1991
|
81.9
|
28.5
|
6.8
|
2.5
|
1.1
|
1.1
|
0.7
|
0.7
|
|
2001
|
84.3
|
34.8
|
8.4
|
3.0
|
1.6
|
1.5
|
1.1
|
1.1
|
|
2011
|
94.6
|
47.9
|
15.2
|
4.7
|
1.3
|
1.4
|
1.6
|
0.0
|
|
Uttar Pradesh
| ||||||||
|
1961
|
17.0
|
2.5
|
1.0
|
0.6
|
0.4
|
0.4
|
0.3
|
0.4
|
|
1971
|
26.6
|
3.8
|
1.1
|
0.6
|
0.7
|
0.4
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
|
1981
|
39.0
|
5.8
|
1.0
|
0.3
|
0.2
|
0.2
|
0.1
|
0.2
|
|
1991
|
53.0
|
8.1
|
1.5
|
0.7
|
0.3
|
0.7
|
0.6
|
0.6
|
|
2001
|
72.6
|
16.1
|
3.0
|
1.0
|
0.6
|
0.6
|
0.4
|
0.5
|
|
2011
|
89.9
|
42.6
|
10.8
|
1.6
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
0.0
|
Source: Computed from
Census Data for various years
Table 2 Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) (15-49 age group) in
India and Selected States
|
Selected
States
|
1961
|
1971
|
1981
|
1991
|
2001
|
2011
|
|
Bihar
|
15.93
|
16.37
|
17.08
|
17.56
|
18.59
|
21.02
|
|
Kerala
|
20.05
|
21.07
|
21.84
|
22.27
|
21.96
|
22.71
|
|
Tamil Nadu
|
18.45
|
19.61
|
20.27
|
20.91
|
21.41
|
23.12
|
|
Uttar Pradesh
|
15.99
|
16.57
|
17.28
|
18.06
|
19.57
|
22.25
|
|
India
|
16.84
|
17.76
|
18.66
|
19.26
|
20.20
|
22.22
|
Source: Same as in Table 1
Table 3 – Percentage remaining single among females in each age group
in France, Japan, UK and US 1970-2010
|
Age
|
1970s
|
1980s
|
1990s
|
2000
|
2009-10
| |||||||||||||||
|
France 1970
|
Japan 1970
|
UK 1971
|
US
1970
|
France 1985
|
Japan 1985
|
UK
1981
|
US
1980
|
France 1999
|
Japan 1995
|
UK
1991
|
US
1990
|
France 2005
|
Japan 2005
|
UK
2001
|
US
2000
|
France 2009
|
Japan 2010
|
UK
2009
|
US
2009
| |
|
15-19
|
93.7
|
97.9
|
91.3
|
88.1
|
97.9
|
99.1
|
95.5
|
90.8
|
99.4
|
99.3
|
98.2
|
94.3
|
99.1
|
99.2
|
95.2
|
94.1
|
99.5
|
99.4
|
99.6
|
97.2
|
|
20-24
|
46.1
|
71.7
|
40.3
|
36.3
|
65.0
|
81.6
|
53.7
|
51.3
|
93.1
|
86.8
|
75.4
|
64.6
|
90.8
|
88.7
|
69.1
|
69.1
|
92.9
|
89.6
|
93.3
|
77.4
|
|
25-29
|
16.5
|
18.1
|
13.9
|
12.2
|
27.2
|
30.6
|
19.2
|
22.0
|
66.2
|
48.2
|
38.4
|
32.0
|
66.8
|
59.1
|
38.1
|
38.1
|
70.8
|
60.3
|
71.9
|
46.3
|
|
30-34
|
10.5
|
7.2
|
7.8
|
7.4
|
14.4
|
10.4
|
8.8
|
10.8
|
40.0
|
19.7
|
18.2
|
18.2
|
44.5
|
32.0
|
21.9
|
21.9
|
48.7
|
34.5
|
47.8
|
26.3
|
|
35-39
|
8.9
|
5.8
|
7.2
|
5.9
|
9.4
|
6.6
|
6.2
|
8.1
|
26.2
|
10.1
|
10.2
|
10.0
|
32.4
|
18.8
|
14.3
|
13.4
|
36.5
|
23.1
|
31.8
|
16.4
|
|
40 – 44
|
8.4
|
5.3
|
7.7
|
5.4
|
7.5
|
4.9
|
5.6
|
3.9
|
16.7
|
6.8
|
6.4
|
|
23.4
|
12.2
|
9.8
|
|
27.9
|
17.4
|
22.0
|
13.1
|
|
45 – 49
|
8.3
|
4.0
|
8.3
|
5.4
|
6.7
|
4.3
|
6.0
|
4.8
|
11.6
|
5.6
|
5.2
|
5.6
|
16.2
|
8.3
|
7.1
|
8.0
|
20.7
|
12.6
|
15.1
|
11.5
|
|
50 – 54
|
8.1
|
2.7
|
9.0
|
5.7
|
7.0
|
4.4
|
6.8
|
4.8
|
8.5
|
4.6
|
5.0
|
|
11.5
|
6.2
|
5.2
|
|
14.4
|
8.7
|
10.2
|
10.0
|
Source: United Nations (2012) World Marriage
Prospects -2014
Table 4: Singulate Mean Age at Marriage ( SMAM) in India and Developed
Countries
|
|
1961
|
1970 Circa
|
1980 Circa
|
1990 Circa
|
2000 Circa
|
Latest
|
|
India
|
16.84
|
17.76
|
18.66
|
19.26
|
20.20
|
21.75
|
|
USA
|
|
20.5
|
23.3
|
25.4
|
26
|
26.9
|
|
UK
|
|
21.3
|
23
|
26.4
|
26.3
|
31.8
|
|
France
|
|
22.3
|
24.7
|
30.7
|
31
|
31.6
|
|
Japan
|
|
24.7
|
25.8
|
27.7
|
29.4
|
29.7
|
Source: Same as in Table 3
Table 5: Percentage of Single men in India, Bihar, Kerala,
Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, 2001|
Age
|
India
|
Bihar
|
Kerala
|
Tamil Nadu
|
Uttar Pradesh
|
|
15-19
|
97.20
|
95.90
|
100.00
|
100.00
|
97.64
|
|
20-24
|
74.47
|
65.48
|
94.94
|
90.36
|
73.00
|
|
25-29
|
37.78
|
27.85
|
66.67
|
54.26
|
34.44
|
|
30-34
|
13.51
|
6.67
|
27.03
|
19.32
|
11.11
|
|
35-39
|
4.35
|
1.69
|
9.59
|
6.41
|
4.92
|
|
40-44
|
3.39
|
0.00
|
4.17
|
2.86
|
4.26
|
|
45-49
|
1.85
|
0.00
|
2.94
|
1.56
|
2.27
|
|
50-54
|
2.50
|
0.00
|
1.69
|
1.89
|
3.23
|
|
55-59
|
0.00
|
0.00
|
1.82
|
0.00
|
3.57
|
Source: Same as in Table 1
Table 6: Logistic Regression Result on the Odds of being
Married, 2005-06)
(0=unmarried; 1=ever married)
|
Background
Characteristics
|
India
| |||||||||||
|
Coeff
|
Odds Ratio
| |||||||||||
|
Type of place
of residence
|
Rural
|
|
| |||||||||
|
Urban
|
-.401
|
.670***
| ||||||||||
|
Age of Women
|
Current Age
|
.407
|
1.503***
| |||||||||
|
Religion and
Caste
|
Christians
|
|
| |||||||||
|
Muslims
|
.601
|
1.823***
| ||||||||||
|
Other Religions
|
.295
|
1.343***
| ||||||||||
|
Hindu – SC
|
.983
|
2.674***
| ||||||||||
|
Hindu – ST
|
.700
|
2.014***
| ||||||||||
|
Hindu – OBC
|
1.078
|
2.937***
| ||||||||||
|
Hindu – Others
|
.733
|
2.082***
| ||||||||||
|
Educational level of women
|
Illiterates
|
|
| |||||||||
|
Primary
|
-.587
|
.556***
| ||||||||||
|
Secondary
|
-1.409
|
.244***
| ||||||||||
|
Higher
|
-2.819
|
.060***
| ||||||||||
|
Wealth index
|
Poorest
|
|
| |||||||||
|
Poorer
|
-.014
|
.986***
| ||||||||||
|
Middle
|
-.177
|
.837***
| ||||||||||
|
Richer
|
-.234
|
.791***
| ||||||||||
|
Richest
|
-.398
|
.672***
| ||||||||||
|
State
|
All Other States
|
|
| |||||||||
|
Bihar
|
.454
|
1.574***
| ||||||||||
|
Kerala
|
-.168
|
.846***
| ||||||||||
|
Tamilnadu
|
-.594
|
.552***
| ||||||||||
|
Uttar Pradesh
|
.041
|
1.042***
| ||||||||||
|
Constant
|
|
-7.263
|
.001
| |||||||||
|
Source: Estimated from National Family Health Survey-3
(2005-06) micro data,
IIPS and
Macro International (2007)
| ||||||||||||
[1] Emeritus Professor, International Institute
for Population Sciences (IIPS), Mumbai and National Fellow, Indian Council for
Social Science Research ( ICSSR)
[2] Professor and Head, Population Research
Center, Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC) , Bangalore.
The authors are thankful to Dr Vaithilingam,
Documentation specialist at IIPS, Mumbai, N Kavitha and Annie George, ISEC,
Bangalore and Mr. Senthil Selvan, Research Assistant to the project to the senior
author.
http://www.epw.in/journal/2015/13/special-articles/golden-cage.html